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T
HE Home Owners' Loan Corporation was established during
the summer of to help families prevent loss of their homes
through mortgage foreclosure. The program provided for (1) the
exchange of HOLC bonds (with federal guarantee first of interest
only but later, beginning in the spring of 1934, with guarantee of
both interest and principal) for home mortgages in default and, in
a few cases, for (2) cash loans for payment of taxes and mortgage re-
financing. HOLC loans were restricted to mortgages in default (or
mortgages held by financial institutions in distress) and secured by
nonfarm properties with dwelling space for not more than four fam-
ilies and appraised at not more than $20,000 by the HOLC; no loans
could exceed 80 percent of HOLC appraisal, nor could any loan ex-
ceed $14,000. Loans were to bear not over 5 percent interest and were
to be amortized by monthly payments during their fifteen-year life..
Serious troubles arose in building an adequate organization on
very short notice and in initiating the actual lending operations, but
by the autumn of 1934 over 400 HOLC offices were accepting appli-
cations. During the initial lending period—from June 1933 to June
1935—the HOLC received 1,886,491 applications for $6.2 billion of
home mortgage refinancing, an average of $3,272 per application.
According to estimates in the present study, HOLC refinancing was
requested for about 40 percent of all mortgaged properties of quali-
fying size, value, and location, and for about one-fifth of all the na-
tion's nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings. Nearly half the applica-
tions, however, were withdrawn or rejected. Roughly, one million
refinancing loans totaling $3.1 billion and averaging $3,039 per loan
were made, 70 percent of which were made during the twelve-month
period beginning in March 1934. For the country as a whole, owners
of about one out of ten nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings (one- to
four-family structures) and one out of five mortgaged dwellings re-
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ceived HOLC refinancing aid. Seventy-five percent of the loans were
for less than $4,000 and amounted, on the average, to 69 percent of
the HOLC appraised value of the property. The average loan cost
$39 to close though this varied widely from state to state.
Appraising presented a critical and difficult problem. In an ef-
fort to obtain the quality of appraisals desired, the HOLC trained
and supervised appraisers, most of whom it employed on a part-time
fee basis; HOLC training of personnel in, and, systematizing of, ap-
praisal methods are credited with having helped raise the general level
of American real estate appraisal methods. The HOLC standard was
based on three factors weighted equally:(1) the estimated current
market price, (2) the cost of a simiJar lot at the time of appraisal plus
the cost of reproducing the building, less depreciation, and (3) the
capitalization of the monthly reasonable rental value of the prop-
erty for the last ten years. This formula generall.y yielded appraisals
above prevailing market prices. In addition to its appraisal, the
HOLC obtained a credit report on the reputation of the applicant.
Not much detailed information is available about the properties
on which the HOLC made loans, the borrowers, or the loans refi-
nanced. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that their cases were
bad, though they were not the very worst distress cases of the early
depression. A special National Bureau study of a sample of cases in
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York revealed the following: over
half of the families applying for loans had monthly incomes of from
$50 to $150; 66 percent of the applicants, most of whom had more
than one dependent, were from thirty-five to fifty-five years old; seven
out of ten applicants had purchased the property in the 1920's; most
properties were less than fifteenyears old when the loan application
was filed; one-third of the properties were used to some extent for
business purposes, but 43 percent were single-family dwellings hav-
ing no business use; 87 percent had central heating; and 84 percent
had the same number of baths as families.
One-third of the sample loans in these three states were on houses
in New York City and slightly more were in communities of less than
25,000 population. One-fourth were appraised at less than $5,000
and 40 percent from $5,000 to $8,000; two-thirds were in districts
classified as "residential" and "stable." The properties were in mod-
erately good physical condition, inasmuch as in 70 percent of the
cases the appraiser had estimated depreciation atlessthan 25 percent.SUMMARY 3
Over half the loans in these three states were for less than $5,000;
three-fourths were for from 60 percent to somewhat over 80 percent
of the appraisal; even on the basis of estimated current market values,
54 percent of the borrowers had an estimated equity in the property
of one-fourth or more above their obligations on the property.
At first, servicing of loans consisted of little more than the mail-
ing.of monthly statements of payments due. Gradually, however, the
HOLC developed much more elaborate and effective loan-servicing
methods. Each account delinquent for more than two or three
months received individual attention; and in more difficult cases an
I-IOLC representative tried to help the borrower plan and adjust
his affairs. Amounts in arrears were frequently added to the remain-
ing balance. Varied, extensive, and time-consuming efforts were
made to help prevent foreclosure. Borrowers—especially those who
showed good faith—were treated very leniently.
Yet the HOLC acquired almost 200,000 houses—82 percent by
formal foreclosure and the rest by voluntary transfer—half of these
by the end of 1937. In New York and Massachusetts, over 40 per-
cent of all loans were foreclosed; the average for the Mountain and
Pacific Coast states was slightly over 11 percent. At the time of fore-
closure, .most loans had been many months delinquent—56 percent
for eighteen months or more. The HOLC attributed foreclosure to
the following reasons: noncooperation of the borrower, 45 percent;
obstinate refusal to pay, 22 percent; total inability to pay, 18 percent;
abandonment of property, 11 percent; and death of borrower and
legal complications, combined, 5 percent. In only a small minority
of cases did the HOLC believe that economic conditions made im-
possible the successful carrying of the loan; much more significant
was the borrower's lack of determination to make the necessary ef-
fort—not his economic inability to meet his financial obligations.
The special National Bureau study of cases in Connecticut, New
Jersey, and New York throws some light on factors associated with
differences in foreclosure rates. "Over-housing," as suggested by loan
amounts and average rental values high in relation to income, seemed
commonly associated with foreclosures. Above-average foreclosure
rates were associated with the younger and the older borrowers; with
properties having some business use; with properties of higher value,
more rooms, and high ratios of land to total value; with loans for
larger amounts and for higher loan-to-value ratios. The total amount4
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due at time of foreclosure averaged 11 percent more than the original
loan.
The management and sale of acquired properties was for many
years a major HOLC problem. Each house was treated as an individ-
ual problem. Local real estate brokers were relied upon, for the most
part, to handle details; general policies, major decisions, and over-all
supervision came from the HOLC. An average of $451 per property
was spent on reconditioning and $135 on maintenance during HOLC
ownership. Most houses were rented until sale could be arranged on
satisfactory terms. Special and successful efforts were made to reduce
fire losses, and, for some time, the I-IOLC acted as a self-insurer on
the properties it owned. The HOLC Ordinarily announced a price at
which each property would be sold and made the necessary listing
with brokers. Especially in the early years, however, little or no effort
was made to sell at what were considered sacrifice prices. The HOLC
did, however, offer prospective buyers of its properties finanéing
terms which at the time were more favorable than those obtainable
elsewhere. On the basis of its own accounting, the HOLC computed
its total net loss on properties acquired—all of which have been sold
—at $310 million. The average loss per property (after deducting
income earned while the property was owned by the HOLC) was
$1,568. Losses were especially heavy in Massachusetts, New Jersey,
and New York. Two-thirds of all properties had been sold by De-
cember 1940. In the final accounting, total sales prices equaled 93
percent of the original HOLC loan amount.
HOLC lending was not confined to refinancing distress mort-
gages. By June 30, 1937,444,226 reconditioning loans for $83 million
had been completed, an average of $190 a case; in other words, more
than four out of each ten original borrowers received supplemental
loans for reconditioning. Almost half the applications for such loans
were rejected, however; of the $400 million of reconditioning funds
at its disposal, the HOLC used only one-fifth, leaving about $320
million unused.
To prevent tax defaults and to insure continuation of insurance
coverage, the HOLC by 1934 found it desirable to make additional
loans for taxes and insurance; within a few years an extensive pro-
gram had been developed for the collection of accruing taxes and
insurance premiums with regular monthly payments. Formal or in-
formal extensions of time for payments of amounts in default con-SUMMARY 5
stituted in effect a large amount of lending. Though the HOLC be-
lieved that it was using its authority to grant extensions wherever
conditions justified its so doing, pressure to increase its authority
and to liberalize payment terms led Congress in 1939 to pass the
Mead-Barry Act, permitting the HOLC to add as much as ten years
to. the original fifteen years of loan life. Monthly payments for amor-
tization were thereby reduced. By the end of 1942, however, only
30 percent of outstanding loans—generally, the larger loans—had re-
ceived Mead-Barry extensions; a small fraction of applications for
such extensions were rejected, but most borrowers simply failed to
request liberalization. Purchasers of properties from the HOLC
received loans and advances of $604 million through March 31, 1951;
the record of these loans has been good. The interest rate for all bor-
rowers was cut one-tenth—from 5 to 41/2percent—inOctober 1939.
In carrying out its functions, the HOLC faced unique and dif-
ficult administrative problems. Some of the original personnel ap-
pointments were unfortunate, the result of political maneuvering
in some areas and unwise decisions in the face of a pressing need for
immediate action, but, before the end of 1933, better standards had
become effective. In fifteen months, the HOLC built to its peak an
organization of 20,000 employees; thereafter, staff reductions were
made more or less regularly. Enough local offices were maintained
into the 1940's to permit easy personal contact with most borrowers.
Local staffs were supervised by regional offices, which in turn were
subject to general policies formulated at the national level. In addi-
tion to its staff of salaried personnel, the HOLC maintained person-
nel on a fee and commission basis for appraisals, legal work, and
property management and sale. The HOLC made deliberate efforts
to develop and maintain good personnel policies. Morale was good,
especially in the early years, and large amounts of uncompensated
overtime were worked voluntarily.
Except at the start of its operations, HOLC financing was subject
to general and increasing Treasury direction; by 1941 Treasury con-
trol dominated. Fortunately for its financial record, the HOLC was
able to take advantage of large declines in the rates of interest at
which the government could borrow funds. For the period 1933
through 1949, the average rate paid by the HOLC was 2.243 percent;
the net spread between what it paid and what it received was about
2.5 percent. The HOLC met its operating costs out of its own in-6 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
come, subject, however, to limits specified by Congress in the ordi-
nary appropriation process for salaried personnel, office space, equip-
ment and supplies. The HOLC never spent for the full
sum authorized by Congress.
Most observers and supporters originally expected the HOLC
to lose money—perhaps a great deal. Yet by the spring of 1951,' the
HOLC had finally liquidated at a slight profit; borrowers had paid
off their loan balances, for the most part, and the remaining balances
were sold to private institutions. Many things explain this surpris-
ingly good outcome. In a broad sense, perhaps, the desire of home
owners to keep their homes was most important; good management
by the HOLC and a large decline in the rate of interest it had to pay
for borrowed funds were also important. It is not clear whether
World War II and the prosperity associated with it had good or bad
effects on balance on the HOLC financial record. Had the sale of
loans to private institutions after 1948 not been pressed by Congress,
the financial results would, however, have been somewhat more
favorable.
1Aminor technical problem complicated somewhat th& selection of a final closing
date for our statistical compilations, with the result that while we use March 31, 1951
as a terminal date the official closing date of HOLC is April 30, 1951. This discrepancy
arose from the following circumstance: when our data were collected the HOLC antici-
pated that its books could be completely closed on March 31 but it was found necessary
to extend this date to April 30 when payment for one piece of property was received
after March 31 and certain other minor bookkeeping adjustments had to be made.
However, insofar as these incidents affect our data they were properly anticipated prior
to March 31 with the result that our data are complete to the final liquidation of HOLC
though we use a terminal date which precedes the official closing by one month.